Entitlement to an initial 100 percent rating for service-connected psychotic disorder prior to January 1, 1996 is granted.

Citation Nr: A26069966 Decision Date: 07/30/26 Archive Date: 07/30/26 DOCKET NO. 220119-212159 DATE: July 30, 2026 ORDER Entitlement to an initial 100 percent rating for service-connected psychotic disorder prior to January 1, 1996 is granted. Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) from January 1, 1996 to April 30, 2002 is denied. Entitlement to a TDIU from April 30, 2002 to June 27, 2021 is granted. Entitlement to a TDIU from June 28, 2021 onward is dismissed as moot. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Resolving reasonable doubt in his favor, the Veteran was employed but earned below the poverty threshold due to his service-connected psychotic disorder prior to January 1, 1996, and his psychotic disorder was his only service-connected disability and was rated at 70 percent prior to January 1, 1996. 2. From January 1, 1996 to April 30, 2002, the Veteran was gainfully employed, and the evidence fails to demonstrate that such employment was in a protected environment. 3. From April 30, 2002 to June 27, 2021, the Veteran was unable to obtain or maintain substantially gainful employment due to his service-connected psychotic disorder. 4. From June 28, 2021 onward, the Veteran is in receipt of a 100 percent rating for his service-connected psychotic disorder, which is his only service-connected disability. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for entitlement to an initial 100 percent rating for service-connected psychotic disorder prior to January 1, 1996 have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.340, 3.341, 4.3, 4.16 (1990). 2. The criteria for entitlement to a TDIU from January 1, 1996 to April 30, 2002 have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.340, 3.341, 4.3, 4.16. 3. The criteria for entitlement to a TDIU from April 30, 2002 to June 27, 2021 have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.340, 3.341, 4.3, 4.16. 4. There is no remaining case or controversy as to the issue of entitlement to a TDIU from June 28, 2021 onward; therefore, the criteria for dismissal of the issue of entitlement to a TDIU from June 28, 2021 onward have been met. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(5). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from August 1981 to November 1992. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal of a January 2022 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). Later in January 2022, the Veteran submitted a VA Form 10182, Decision Review Request: Board Appeal (Notice of Disagreement), appealing the January 2022 rating decision to the Board. He elected the Hearing option; therefore, the Board may only consider the evidence of record at the time of the January 2022 rating decision, as well as any evidence that either he or his representative submitted at the hearing, which was held by the undersigned in July 2025, or within 90 days thereafter. 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(a). In the 90 days following the July 2025 Board hearing, the Veteran submitted additional evidence, which the Board has considered as to this appeal. As an initial matter, the Board recognizes that VA regulations provide, "[u]pon request, a claimant is entitled to a hearing on any issue involved in a claim...before VA issues notice of a decision on an initial or supplemental claim." 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(d)(1). That regulation does not indicate that the claimant is entitled to pre-decisional notice of this optional hearing. In November 2022, VA amended VA Form 21-526EZ and, in May 2024, VA amended VA Form 20-0995 to inform claimants of the right to a hearing at any time during the claims process. The claim underlying this appeal was filed on an earlier version of VA Form 20-0995. However, the Board finds that any error in the failure to inform the Veteran of the right to a pre-decisional hearing before the RO was harmless error. In Bowen, the Court found that when a claimant is denied a hearing before the RO, there is no due process violation if he is subsequently offered the opportunity for a hearing before the Board, even if a hearing was not requested or conducted, as long as there is no violation of due process concerning the Board hearing opportunity. Bowen v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 250, 253-4 (2012). The facts in the case can be differentiated on several levels, to include that the Veteran did not actually request an RO hearing and the issue in Bowen was not one of notice. Regardless, the Board cannot find a basis to conclude that the underlying holding and logic of the Bowen case would not lead to the same finding of no prejudicial error under the procedure and facts of this case. The notification letters informing the Veteran of the January 2022 rating decision included a VA Form 20-0998, Your Right to Seek Review of Our Decision, which outlined the Veteran's appeal options, to include a hearing before the Board. Additionally, the Veteran elected to attend a hearing before a VLJ, which was held in July 2025, as referenced above. Because the Veteran attended a Board hearing, there was no due process violation in the processing of the claims or any suggestion that the Veteran was prejudiced by the failure of VA to provide a hearing at the RO level. See Bowen. The Board has thoroughly reviewed all evidence received prior to issuance of the January 2022 rating decision. In every decision, the Board must provide a statement of the reasons or bases for its determination, adequate to enable an appellant to understand the precise basis for the Board's decision, as well as to facilitate review by the Court. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1). Although the entire record must be reviewed by the Board, the Court has repeatedly found that the Board is not required to discuss, in detail, every piece of evidence. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143, 149 (2001) (rejecting the notion that the Veterans Claims Assistance Act mandates that the Board discuss all evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claim. In Medlin, the Court emphasized that "the duty to provide reasons and bases extends to material issues of law and fact 'upon which the outcome of the litigation depends'" rather than "every peripheral fact or detail in a record whose ultimate relevance to dispositive findings is unclear." Medlin v. Collins,?No. 24-3304 (U.S. Vet. App., April 6, 2026). Discussion The Veteran seeks entitlement to a TDIU, with his representative initially contending that he was unable to obtain or maintain substantially gainful employment due to his service-connected psychotic disorder from the effective date of service connection for such. See July 2021 Statement in Support of Claim. His representative more recently contended, however, entitlement to a TDIU is warranted, effective April 30, 2002, as the Social Security Administration (SSA) awarded him disability benefits, effective April 30, 2002. See January 2022 Correspondence. Initially, the Board notes that the Veteran was awarded service connection for his psychotic disorder, effective July 18, 1995, in a July 2021 rating decision, and the RO expressly recognized that the issue of entitlement to a TDIU was raised prior to its formal award of service connection for this disability. When the RO decided that the issue of entitlement to a TDIU was moot in a January 2022 rating decision, the Veteran appealed that decision to the Board, giving rise to the instant appeal. As such the period on appeal begins on July 18, 1995-the effective date of service connection for the psychotic disorder-and extends to January 14, 2022-the date of issuance of the January 2022 rating decision on appeal. Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a), a TDIU may be assigned where the schedular rating is less than total, when it is found that the disabled person is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of a single service-connected disability ratable at 60 percent or more, or as a result of two or more service-connected disabilities, provided that one of those disabilities is ratable 40 percent or more, and there is sufficient additional service-connected disability to bring the combined rating to 70 percent or more. See also 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.340, 3.341. The Veteran is in receipt of an initial 70 percent rating for his service-connected psychotic disorder from July 18, 1995-the effective date of service connection for such-to June 27, 2021 and in receipt of a 100 percent rating for this disability from June 28, 2021 onward. Therefore, he meets the schedular criteria for entitlement to a TDIU throughout the appeal period. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). For the portion of the appeal period prior to November 7, 1996, an additional subsection, subsection (c), was included in 38 C.F.R. § 4.16. This subsection provided: The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section are not for application in cases in which the only compensable service-connected disability is a mental disorder assigned a 70 percent evaluation, and such mental disorder precludes a veteran from securing or following a substantially gainful occupation. In such cases, the mental disorder shall be assigned a 100 percent schedular evaluation under the appropriate diagnostic code. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(c) (1990); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 4281 (January 30, 1989) (adding paragraph (c) to 38 C.F.R. § 4.16); 61 Fed. Reg. 52700 (October 8, 1996) (removing paragraph (c) from 38 C.F.R. § 4.16). Thus, with § 4.16(c) in effect for the portion of the appeal period prior to November 7, 1996, if the Board finds that the Veteran was precluded from securing or following a substantially gainful occupation due to his service-connected psychotic disorder prior to November 7, 1996, the Board must award a 100 percent rating for his psychotic disorder rather than award entitlement to a TDIU. VA will grant TDIU benefits when the evidence shows that the Veteran is precluded, by reason of his service-connected disabilities, from obtaining and maintaining any form of gainful employment consistent with his education and occupational experience. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.340, 3.341, 4.16. A substantially gainful occupation is as "an occupation that provides an annual income that exceeds the poverty threshold for one person, irrespective of the number of hours or days that the Veteran actually works and without regard to the Veteran's earned annual income." Faust v. West, 13 Vet. App. 342 (2000). Marginal employment shall not be considered substantially gainful employment. Substantially gainful employment is defined as work that is more than marginal, which permits the individual to earn a "living wage." Id. Whether the veteran can find employment is not determinative; the focus of the inquiry is on "whether the veteran is capable of performing the physical and mental acts required by employment." See Van Hoose v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 361, 363 (1993). In Ray v. Wilkie, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) interpreted and defined the phrase "unable to secure and follow a substantially gainful occupation" in § 4.16 to encompass two components: one economic and one noneconomic. Ray, 31 Vet. App. 58, 72 (2019). The Court has held that the economic component "simply means an occupation earning more than marginal income (outside of a protected environment) as determined by the U.S. Department of Commerce as the poverty threshold for one person." Id. at 73. Marginal employment may be held to exist on a facts-found basis when earned annual income exceeds the poverty threshold, known as "employment in a protected environment." 38 C.F.R. § 4.16. The Court recently defined this phrased to unambiguously mean "a lower-income position that, due to the veteran's service-connected disability or disabilities, is shielded in some respect from competition in the employment market." LaBruzza v. McDonough, 37 Vet. App. 111, 114 (2024). Regarding the noneconomic component, the Court provided guidance as to "the meaning of a veteran's ability to 'secure and follow' such employment." The Court held that attention must be given to: the veteran's history, education, skill, and training; whether the veteran has the physical ability to perform the type of activities required by the occupation at issue; and whether the veteran has the mental ability to perform the activities required by the occupation at issue. Ray, 31 Vet. App. at 72. The Court noted that this is not "a checklist that must be run through in every case;" rather, "discussion of any factor is only necessary if the evidence raises it." Id. Economic Component The Veteran submitted VA Form 21-8940, Veteran's Application for Increased Compensation based on Unemployability, seemingly with assistance, in July 2021. Per this form, he reported last working full-time and becoming too disabled to work in 1995. He further reported working at an adult care facility from February 1995 through June 1995, earning, at most, $520 per month, and at an Air Force base in the mailroom throughout July 1995, earning, at most, $540 per month. The individual who assisted him in completing the form noted that he was awarded SSA disability benefits in 1995. More recently, the Veteran attempted to detail his work history at the July 2025 Board hearing. He testified that, after leaving the Air Force in 1992, he went to work at a labor company for a month, worked at a steel company for six years and two months, worked near an Air Force Base for four months, worked as a custodian for two weeks in 2001 or 2002, and then worked for a residential care facility for two months. His representative specified that he was seeking entitlement to a TDIU with an effective date in 2002, consistent with his receipt of SSA disability benefits, but contended that an earlier effective date could be warranted as he had trouble holding employment prior to being awarded SSA disability benefits. The Veteran's SSA disability benefits records are associated with the claims file and include some discussion of his employment history during the appeal period. In May 2002, he reported that his illness-specified as schizoaffective disorder-kept him from working right due to emotional pain, first started bothering him in 1992, and caused him to become unable to work in April 2002. He further reported that his illness caused him to change his job duties and make job-related changes, such as requiring him "to have inside track for work." He listed his post-1992 to April 2002 employment history as including short or temporary work at a restaurant, in lawn care, in delivery, in steel fabrication, and for an additional two non-specific employers. See May 2002 SSA Disability Report. In September 2002, he reported that he believed he last worked in April 2002 for a residential care facility, and he was fired from his job after he quit taking his medication and was unable to follow the routine of the facility. See September 2002 SSA Psychological Report. Around or shortly following June 2003, he reported that his illnesses-specified as back problems and schizoaffective disorder-were a hindrance to his ability working, first started bothering him June 1987, and caused him to stop working in June 2003. He listed his pre-2001 employment history as including part-time work in sanitation from December 1994 to November 1995, full-time work in deburring for one employer from November 1995 to March 1996 and for another employer from March 1996 to 2001. See Undated SSA Disability Report. Also in June 2003, he reported that he "worked steady until the end of April[] 2002" and was off work until June 25, 2003, when he attempted to work and was let go at the end of the day. See June 2003 SSA Disability Report. In July 2003, he reported working in sanitation from December 1994 to November 1995, in deburring for one employer from November 1995 to March 1996, in deburring for another employer from March 1996 to January 2001, as a custodian for one employer from February 2001 to June 2002, as a custodian for another employer from June 2001 to April 2002, and as a wood drill in July 2003. See July 2003 SSA Work History Report. In September 2003, he reported previously working as a custodian, a steel frame worker, and in a woodworking shop. See September 2003 SSA Comprehensive Internal Medicine Examination. In March 2005, an SSA Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Veteran had been disabled since April 30, 2002, and although he worked for periods of a few days at a time after his alleged onset date of disability, his earnings from this work did not constitute substantial gainful activity. The Veteran's VA treatment records from the late 1990s and early 2000s also include limited discussion of his employment history during the appeal period. In January 1996, he reported that he had changed jobs and worked as a steelman. See January 1996 Progress Note. In November 1996, he reported that he had been working regularly for one year. See November 1996 Progress Note. In September 1998, he described his job situation as fair. See September 1998 Psychiatry Note. In July 1999, he reported working at a warehouse and described his job situation as good. See July 1999 Primary Care Note & Psychiatry Note. In July 2001, he reported working as a custodian. See July 2001 Psychiatry Note. Additionally, the Veteran's representative submitted a copy of his SSA earnings history in the 90-day evidentiary window following the July 2025 Board hearing. Immediately below, the Board has included a summary of his annual earnings for the years relevant to this appeal along with the U.S. Census Bureau's poverty threshold for each respective year, which is the prescribed cut-off amount for annual income to be considered marginal income pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 4.16. 1994 1995 1996 1997 Earnings History $547 $7,619 $13,219 $15,229 Poverty Threshold $7,547 $7,763 $7,995 $8,183 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Earnings History $15,247 $15,503 $15,795 $10,329 $3,143 Poverty Threshold $8,316 $8,501 $8,794 $9,039 $9,183 Based on the Veteran's annual earnings history, he earned an income well below the poverty threshold in the year prior to the appeal period (1994) and an income just below the poverty threshold in the first calendar year encompassed by the appeal period (1995). Thereafter, he earned nearly double the poverty threshold from 1996 onward until 2002, the first year he was in receipt of SSA disability benefits (albeit retroactively). In assessing the Veteran's periods of gainful employment and unemployment, the Board affords the greatest probative weight to the Veteran's SSA earnings history, as this history provides a far more objective view of the extent of his employment and annual earnings than the employment and earnings history he reported in seeking both VA and SSA benefits. While the Board has considered the Veteran's retrospectively-reported employment history and affords some probative weight to his more near-contemporaneous reported history (i.e., his 1990s to early 2000s employment history reported in the early 2000s), the Board affords little probative weight to his significantly retrospective reported history (i.e., his 1990s to early 2000s employment history report in the 2020s) due to passage of time since his initial award of SSA disability benefits and the fact that he is service-connected for a severe psychiatric disability involving impairment of thought processes. Overall, the most probative evidence demonstrates that the Veteran earned below the poverty threshold prior to 1996 and from 2002 onward. The Board notes that the specific dates of the Veteran's unemployment or marginal employment prior to 1996 are unclear, but he most contemporaneously reported that he worked until April 2002 or through to the end of April 2002 in the course of seeking SSA disability benefits in the early 2000s, and these reports are consistent with the aforementioned SSA finding that he has been disabled and his earnings did not constitute substantial gainful activity from April 30, 2002 onward. Thus, the Board finds, as did SSA from 2002 onward, that he was not gainfully employed from April 30, 2002 onward. The Board further finds, resolving reasonable doubt in his favor, that he was not gainfully employed prior to January 1, 1996, as his SSA earnings objectively demonstrate that he earned less than the poverty threshold in 1995. The Board also finds, however, that he was gainfully employed from January 1, 1996 to April 30, 2002, as his SSA earnings objectively demonstrate that he earned well above the poverty threshold in 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, and 2001 and he contemporaneously reported working until April 30, 2002. Consequently, he met the economic component of entitlement to a TDIU prior to January 1, 1996 and from April 30, 2002 onward but did not meet the economic component from January 1, 1996 to April 30, 2002. Non-Economic Component As for the non-economic component, the Veteran's contemporaneous treatment records detail the functional impact of his service-connected psychotic disorder shortly prior to and during the early portion of the appeal period. Initially, although retrospective in nature, the Board notes that a September 2002 psychological report prepared for SSA disability benefits purposes provides insight into the Veteran's mental state at the start of the appeal period. In this regard, an SSA contract examiner noted that the Veteran first received mental health treatment while in the Air Force in 2002, was hospitalized at two different facilities, and then was treated on an outpatient basis in Alaska, where he "just laid on the floor for a year and a half" until 1995. The examiner further noted that he moved to Oklahoma in 1995. See September 2002 Psychological Report. In the year prior to the appeal period, in October 1994, he established care with VA to renew his existing psychiatric medications and reported varied diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder versus schizophrenia versus psychosis. A provider documented that he denied hearing voices or being suicidal or homicidal at that time. The provider added that he had no insight into his problem and that his wife reported that he was "crazy when he is off the medication." See October 1994 Ambulatory Mental Health Clinic Consultation. At the start of the appeal period, in August 1995, he reported having "visions," and he exhibited religious preoccupations and paranoid ideations but denied suicidal or homicidal ideations. A provider noted that he would be able to drive if he took his medications regularly-suggesting that he was not allowed to drive at that point in time. In October 1995, he again exhibited paranoid and religious ideations but noted his insight and judgment were adequate and his speech was within normal limits. His provider again noted that he would be able to drive if he was compliant with his medications. In January 1996, he reported wanting to drive a truck, seemingly for work, and a provider noted that he may be able to drive a class C vehicle. The provider seemingly also observed that he was less paranoid, denied suicidal or homicidal ideations, and exhibited normal speech and adequate insight and judgment. The Board notes, however, that the provider's handwriting is somewhat illegible. In April 1996, he again denied suicidal or homicidal ideations and a provider observed that he was less paranoid, his speech was within normal limits, and his insight and judgment were adequate. In July 1996, his wife reported that he was hearing voices and was getting worse. In October 1996, he reported not taking his medications as prescribed and denied suicidal or homicidal ideation. A provider observed that he was paranoid, but his speech was within normal limits and his insight and judgment were adequate. In November 1996, he reported working regularly for a year and that he was able to drive appropriately, and a provider documented that he denied suicidal or homicidal ideation; his paranoid ideation memory, and speech were within normal limits; and his insight and judgment were adequate. As noted above, the Veteran's SSA earnings history demonstrates that he earned nearly double the poverty threshold between 1996 and 2000 and over the poverty threshold in 2001. The Board included the above discussion of his contemporaneous VA treatment records for 1996 to the extent that such records could have suggested that his ability to work following his earlier period of unemployment/underemployment varied; however, as his 1996 treatment records indicate that he was able to work and drive regularly in 1996, the Board will not further address records contemporaneous to his period of sustained employment from 1996 to mid-2001. The Board notes that there is no suggestion, either from the lay statements of record or the contemporaneous evidence, that his income during this timeframe was earned in a protected environment and thus represented marginal employment. See LaBruzza, 37 Vet. App. at 114. A few years later, in December 2001, the Veteran reported hearing voices telling him bad things once per week, and a provider documented that he denied suicidal or homicidal ideations and exhibited adequate memory, speech, insight, and judgment, but was paranoid. In April 2002, he reported that he had been off of his medications for two months. In June 2002, he denied suicidal or homicidal ideations and a provider observed that he exhibited adequate memory, speech, insight, and judgment but noted that he was paranoid and depressed. In May 2002, in the course of seeking private treatment, he reported that he felt his eyes and ears were a gift and that his visions and auditory hallucinations were divine messages. A provider observed that he exhibited delusions of grandeur and limited insight and judgment but no suicidal or homicidal ideation. See May 2002 Dr. D.L. Treatment Notes. In May 2003, he brought a notebook to a psychiatry visit, which contained notes his wife had made about his behaviors. She indicated that he saw spots and snares, sometimes heard voices, and believed that she was Babylon's daughter. A provider observed that he had no thoughts of hurting himself or others, but his insight and judgment were not very good. In August 2003, he continued to report auditory hallucinations that did not seem to bother him, and a provider noted that he had no thoughts of hurting himself or others, and his insight and judgment were reasonable. In February 2004, his wife reported that he was delusional at times, kept staring into space, was like a child, did not have any motivation, and was unable to work. A provider observed that he had no thoughts of hurting himself or others, but he was not fully in touch with reality and his insight and judgment were not very good. In May 2004, he reported still hearing voices, but less intensely, and a provider observed both thought blocking and latency in his responses but also good insight and judgment and no suicidal or homicidal ideations. In October 2004, a provider observed auditory/visual hallucinations and delusions but noted that his insight and judgment were good. From 2002 onward, the Veteran's SSA records provide the most insight into the severity and functional impact of his service-connected psychotic disorder. In September 2002, the Veteran attended an SSA contract psychological examination, and when asked why he applied for disability assistance, he responded that he thought he was still able to work. He reported sometimes hearing voices, which he heard a lot of in his first job. He indicated that he attempted to get along with others but often got upset about others not doing things the right way and that he did not want to judge others who were outside the church. He endorsed issues with motivation but did not suggest that he had issues with activities of daily living. He further endorsed auditory and visual hallucinations. The examiner observed that he was often slow to respond, presented with a somewhat untidy appearance, engaged in some repetitive behavior, sometimes inappropriately laughed, and exhibited some circumstantial thought processes. In October 2002, an SSA examiner marked that he was moderately limited in understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions and markedly limited in the ability to interact appropriately with the public but not significantly limited in other areas of understanding and memory, sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction, or adaptation. The examiner stated that he was able to understand, remember and carry out simple one-step tasks and some more detailed tasks, as long as he was medication compliant. The examiner further stated that he could work under routine supervision, was able to complete a normal work day and work week, and could adapt to a work situation. The examiner also stated, however, that he could not relate effectively to the general public but was able to relate superficially to coworkers and supervisors about work matters. See October 2002 SSA Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. Also in October 2002, the same SSA examiner marked, as to functional limitation, that he had moderate restriction of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. The examiner further marked that he had one or two extended episodes of decompensation. The examiner documented that he had discontinued all medications for his schizoaffective disorder, was having auditory hallucinations, and was religiously preoccupied. See October 2002 SSA Psych Review Technique. In July 2003, he reported that he slept 12 hours daily and slept in until 2 P.M., noting that he thought his medication made him sleep longer. He further reported being able to get along with others, take care of his personal needs and grooming, prepare his own meals, clean his house, shop for himself, and engage in social and recreational activities. In September 2003, an SSA examiner marked that he was moderately limited in understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions but not significantly limited in other areas of understanding and memory, sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction, or adaptation. The examiner stated that he could understand, remember, and carry out simple tasks; could relate to others for work purposes; and could adapt to a work situation. See September 2003 SSA Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. Also in September 2003, the same SSA examiner marked that he had a schizophrenic, paranoid, or other psychotic disorder, which was evidenced by incoherence, loosening of associations, illogical thinking, or poverty of content of speech associated with blunt affect. As to functional limitations, the examiner marked that he had moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace and mild limitations in activities of daily living and maintaining social functioning. The examiner observed that his affect was blunted and he had no thoughts of hurting himself or others but exhibited poor insight and judgment. See September 2003 SSA Psych Review Technique. On September 30, 2003, someone who helped the Veteran in completing a form noted that he had been committed to a hospital at his wife's initiative since September 15, 2003, he was very slow to do anything, and he heard voices all the time. See September 2003 SSA Reconsideration Disability Report. In March 2004, either the Veteran or someone helping him with his SSA claim submitted excerpts from both his and his wife's diaries dated between October 2003 and February 2004. Across these excerpts, he documented hearing voices, seeing hidden messages, believing movies were real, and having paranoid thoughts, to include worrying that his wife or others would kill him. His wife documented that he refused to do household chores out of fear and other paranoid ideations, and in one instance, when she prompted him to call about getting a job, he told her that he "don't work for the food that perishes." In March 2005, an SSA ALJ awarded disability benefits and stated, in part, The claimant has evidenced inability to understand, remember, carry out instructions; respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; or deal with changes in a routine work setting. The claimant has been unable to sustain work attempts (although several unsuccessful attempts have been made). H[e] is extremely delusional, and his ability to work has been seriously limited by visual and auditory hallucinations. The Administrative Law Judge finds the claimant unable to complete a normal workday or work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and unable to perform work at a consistent pace (without an unreasonable number and length of decompensation/rest periods). The claimant is unable to sustain work activity of any kind. The claimant has schizoaffective disorder. Even while on medication, he has demonstrated a disturbed state of mind. He has heard voices, talked to pictures, and seen demons. He reported that his back has pained him at time because he was "an evil boy." The claimant has been delusional throughout the time period under review. The Board notes that, within the decision, the ALJ documented that the Veteran alleged disability since April 20, 2001 but later amended his alleged onset date to April 30, 2002. The Board further notes that the Veteran has seemingly been in receipt of SSA disability benefits since his award of entitlement to such, effective April 30, 2002, in March 2005. See, e.g., October 2021 SSA Inquiry Results ("Disability Onset Date: 04/30/2002," "Start Date: 04/2005," and "Stop Date: [blank]"). While VA is not bound by SSA's determinations, the legal criteria for entitlement to SSA disability benefits are similar to those for entitlement to a TDIU. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 with 38 C.F.R. § 4.16. However, SSA's legal criteria for finding an individual disabled differ from VA's legal criteria for finding entitlement to a TDIU in that SSA specifically considers the impact of an individual's age and all disabilities whereas VA may not consider the impact of advancing age or any disabilities that are not service-connected. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.341(a), 4.19; Van Hoose, 4 Vet. App. at 363. That being said, the Board notes that the content of the above-detailed March 2005 SSA decision demonstrates that the SSA ALJ found the Veteran disabled due solely to his mental health impairments (i.e., which represents his only service-connected disability) and, due to the fact that he fell within SSA's definition of a younger individual, SSA did so without concluding that his age played a role in his employability. Analysis After review of the lay and medical evidence, and resolving reasonable doubt in favor of the Veteran, the Board finds that the non-economic component of entitlement to a TDIU is met both prior to January 1, 1996 and from April 30, 2002 onward, and so the Board concludes that the Veteran was unable to obtain or maintain substantially gainful employment due to his service-connected psychotic disorder during these periods. The Board further finds, however, because the economic component of entitlement to a TDIU was not met from January 1, 1996 to April 30, 2002, entitlement to a TDIU is not warranted during this portion of the appeal period. Prior to January 1, 1996 As shown by the above-detailed evidence, the record contains little evidence either contemporaneous to 1995 or retrospectively discussing the Veteran's symptoms and functionality in 1995. The Board finds, however, that the little evidence of record pertaining to the severity of his service-connected psychotic disorder in 1995, combined with the fact that the Veteran was not gainfully employed in 1995, suggests that his psychotic disorder likely impacted his ability to earn more than a marginal income. More specifically, he reported experiencing or otherwise exhibited hallucinations, religious preoccupations, and paranoid ideations repeatedly in 1995, and his VA treatment records suggest that he was prohibited from driving due to his mental state. These symptoms would have seemingly inhibited his ability to interact effectively with others and/or focus in a workplace setting, and his apparent restriction on driving due to his overall mental state would seemingly only have compounded the impact of his psychotic disorder on his employability. Again, there is very little evidence to provide full insight into the Veteran's functioning in 1995, specifically, but the Board recognizes that this absence of evidence is likely at least partially due to the fact that (1) the Veteran was not awarded service connection for his psychotic disorder until 2021-26 years after he filed his initial claim for such, and (2) his psychotic disorder has since limited his cognitive functioning, as shown by his more recent treatment records. Ultimately, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of the Veteran. This standard of proof reflects "the high esteem in which our nation holds those who have served in the Armed Services." Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54 (1990). As the Court has noted: [b]y requiring only an 'approximate balance of positive and negative evidence' to prove any issue material to a claim for veterans' benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b), the nation, 'in recognition of our debt to our veterans,' has 'taken upon itself the risk of error' in awarding such benefits. Wise v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 517, 531 (2014). Consistent with the spirit of VA law, resolving reasonable doubt in favor of the Veteran, the Board concludes that he likely could not have secured or followed a substantially gainful occupation due to his service-connected psychotic disorder prior to January 1, 1996. Because the former 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(c), which was in effect until November 7, 1996, directs that, where the only service-connected disability is a mental disorder rated at 70 percent, and where the mental disorder precludes a veteran from securing or following a substantially gainful occupation, the mental disorder shall be assigned a 100 percent schedular evaluation under the appropriate diagnostic code rather than entitlement to a TDIU, the Board herein is assigning a 100 percent rating under the appropriate diagnostic code-Diagnostic Code 9210-prior to January 1, 1996. The assignment of this 100 percent rating based on unemployability prior to January 1, 1996 thus represents a complete award of the benefit sought on appeal prior to January 1, 1996. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(c) (1995). From January 1, 1996 to April 30, 2002 As discussed in the economic component section above, the most persuasive evidence as to the Veteran's earnings and employment history-the SSA earnings statement submitted following the July 2025 Board hearing-objectively establishes, when considered alongside the U.S. Census Bureau's annual poverty thresholds, that he earned more than the poverty threshold in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. Because the record contains no suggestion, let alone affirmative evidence, that his income in any of these years was earned in a protected environment, the Board cannot find that the employment he retained during this period was marginal in nature. Additionally, because the Veteran contemporaneously reported working in 2002 until April 30, 2002 in the course of seeking SSA disability benefits, because an SSA ALJ similarly specifically found that his onset date of disability was April 30, 2002, and because his SSA earnings document $3,143 in income in 2002 (which would generally align with an income amount earned from working only the first four months of a year), the Board finds that he retained gainful employment until April 30, 2002. Further, as, again, the record contains no suggestion, let alone affirmative evidence, that his income from January 1, 2002 to April 30, 2002 was earned in a protected environment, the Board cannot find that the employment he continued to retain during this period was marginal in nature. Consequently, the Board finds that, due to his still-sustained employment extending until April 30, 2002, entitlement to a TDIU is not warranted from January 1, 1996 to April 30, 2002. From April 30, 2002 to June 27, 2021 With the above-detailed evidence contemporaneous to the end of 2001 through to March 2005, the Board finds that it was unlikely the Veteran could have maintained substantially gainful employment after he lost his job on April 30, 2002 due to the symptoms and impairment of his service-connected psychotic disorder. In making this finding, the Board affords the greatest probative weight to the March 2005 SSA decision, per which an ALJ specifically described him as having an inability to understand, remember, carry out instructions; respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; or deal with changes in a routine work setting beginning on April 30, 2002. Again, the legal criteria for entitlement to SSA disability benefits are similar to those for entitlement to a TDIU, and while there are some differences in the criteria-namely as to consideration of other disabilities and advancing age-the content of the March 2005 SSA decision reveals that neither the Veteran's age nor any other disabilities for which he is not service-connected impacted the determination that he was unable to sustain work of any kind. Instead, the ALJ specifically stated that only his mental impairments resulted in significant work-related restrictions. While the record contains some suggestion that the Veteran was capable of some level of work after April 30, 2002, these suggestions were only made by SSA examiners, and the Board finds that the ALJ's determination as to his inability to sustain any work activity is far more probative than the varied suggestions made by SSA examiners in spite of his repeatedly documented hallucinations, delusions, and/or paranoid ideations. Again, the benefit of the doubt is to be resolved in the Veteran's favor. The Board therefore concludes, as the SSA ALJ did, that he could not have secured or followed a substantially gainful occupation due to his service-connected psychotic disorder from April 30, 2002 onward, and so entitlement to a TDIU is warranted from April 30, 2002 through to June 28, 2021-the effective date of his already-assigned 100 percent schedular rating for his service-connected psychotic disorder. In making the above finding, the Board notes that the evidence of record contemporaneous to 2005 onward is not discussed herein, as the Board's review of the evidence reveals no suggestion that he regained gainful employment after April 30, 2002. For instance, his contemporaneous VA treatment records dated after 2005 include no mention of employment and instead note that he has been on disability since 2002. See, e.g., October 2019 Physician Note. At a June 2021 VA mental examination, he specifically denied working (albeit specifying that he last worked in 1992) and reported that he was "ruled delusional in Oklahoma by a judge." His SSA earnings record shows no earnings from 2006 onward. Thus, without any suggestion that the Veteran regained gainful employment after April 30, 2002, entitlement to a TDIU remains warranted from April 30, 2002 through to June 27, 2021. From June 28, 2021 onward Finally, the Board finds that entitlement to a TDIU from June 28, 2021 onward is moot. The Board recognizes that it is not categorically true that the grant of a total schedular disability rating necessarily moots a TDIU claim, particularly as this relates to possible entitlement to special monthly compensation (SMC) at the housebound rate under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s), which provides for SMC where a veteran has one disability rated as total and has additional service-connected disabilities independently ratable at 60 percent or more. See Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280, 293-94 (2008); see also Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 242, 248 (2010) (holding that the first criteria of section 1114(s) can be met by a TDIU based on a single disability but cannot be met by a TDIU based on multiple disabilities). VA has a duty to maximize a veteran's benefits, to include consideration of possible entitlement to SMC in addition to a total disability rating. Here, however, as the Veteran is only service-connected for one disability, he is not eligible for SMC pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s). Consequently, because the Veteran's service-connected acquired psychotic disorder is rated at 100 percent from June 28, 2021 onward and his psychotic disorder is his only service-connected disability, the issue of entitlement to a TDIU is moot from June 28, 2021 onward. See Herlehy v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 33, 35 (2001). Conclusion In sum: " entitlement to a 100 percent rating under Diagnostic Code 9210 for the service-connected psychotic disorder is warranted prior to January 1, 1996 pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(c) (1990) based on the Veteran being unemployable due to this disability. " entitlement to a TDIU is not warranted from January 1, 1996 to April 30, 2002, as the Veteran was gainfully employed during this period. " entitlement to a TDIU is, however, warranted from April 30, 2002 to June 27, 2021, as the Veteran was not gainfully employed during this period and his service-connected psychotic disorder rendered him unemployable. " entitlement to a TDIU is moot beginning June 28, 2021, as the Veteran is receipt of a 100 percent schedular rating for his service-connected psychotic disorder, his only service-connected disability, from June 28, 2021 onward. As the Veteran was advised in a July 6, 2021 letter, he cannot receive full military retired pay and full VA compensation at the same time. However, if his VA compensation is greater than his retired pay, VA will pay him compensation, and he will not receive retired pay. The Veteran and his fiduciary should review the letter they receive from VA when this Board decision is implemented to ensure they understand the award and take any necessary action. MICHELLE L. KANE Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board A. Tierno The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.