Entitlement to revision on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) of a June 7, 1972, rating decision that assigned an initial noncompensable rating for left anterior chest scar under Diagnostic Code (DC) 7805,…

Citation Nr: A26069905 Decision Date: 07/30/26 Archive Date: 07/30/26 DOCKET NO. 260223-628363 DATE: July 30, 2026 ORDER Entitlement to revision on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) of a June 7, 1972, rating decision that assigned an initial noncompensable rating for left anterior chest scar under Diagnostic Code (DC) 7805, is denied. Entitlement to revision on the basis of CUE of the June 7, 1972, rating decision that denied service connection for anxiety neurosis is denied. Entitlement to an effective date prior to January 30, 1989, for the award of service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on the basis of CUE in a March 27, 1991, rating decision, in failing to reconsider the claim under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (c) due to additional service records associated with the claims file in March 1983, is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A June 7, 1972, rating action granted service connection for shrapnel wound, left anterior chest and assigned a noncompensable rating under DC 7805 and denied service connection for anxiety neurosis. The evidence of record reflects that the veteran was notified of the June 7, 1972, rating decision and of the right to appeal. The veteran did not initiate an appeal of the decision nor additional evidence was submitted within the appeal period. 2. In the June 1972 rating decision, he AOJ did not err in evaluating the residuals of the Veteran's shrapnel wound in the left anterior chest under a scar diagnosis code, DC 7805, because the contemporaneous evidence reflected the presence of a scar, but not the presence of other symptoms that were required for evaluation under the muscle injury diagnostic codes such as DC 5303 3. Although the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were before the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) in June 1972, the statutory or regulatory provisions then extant were not correctly applied, but the failure to correctly apply those laws and regulations does not manifestly change the outcome of the June 1972 rating decision that denied service connection for anxiety neurosis. 4. In the March 27, 1991, rating decision, the AOJ granted service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), effective January 30, 1989. The Veteran was notified of this decision in an April 11, 1991, notification letter, which included the VA Form 21-8764, Notice of Procedural and Appellate Rights. The Veteran did not file a notice of disagreement challenging the determination with respect to the effective date, nor was additional evidence for the issue received within one year of the April 11, 1991, notice letter. 5. Although the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were before the AOJ in March 1991, the statutory or regulatory provisions then extant were not correctly applied, but the failure to correctly apply those laws and regulations does not manifestly change the outcome of the March 1991 rating decision that assigned an effective date of January 30, 1989, for the award of service connection for PTSD. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The June 7, 1972, rating decision, became final with respect to the claim of initial rating for left anterior chest shrapnel wound and service connection for a psychiatric disability. 38 U.S.C. § 4005 (c) (1970); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.156, 19.118, 19.153 (1972). 2. The criteria for entitlement to revision of the June 7, 1992, rating decision on the basis of CUE with respect to the issue of rating for left anterior chest wound are not met. 38 U.S.C. § 5109A; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.105(a). 3. The criteria for entitlement to revision of the June 7, 1992, rating decision on the basis of CUE with respect to the issue of service connection for a psychiatric disability are not met. 38 U.S.C. § 5109A; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.105(a). 4. The March 27, 1991, rating decision became final with respect to the issue of earlier effective date for the grant of service connection for PTSD. 38 U.S.C. § 4005 (c) (1988); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.156, 19.129, 19.192 (1990) 5. The criteria for entitlement to revision of the March 27, 1991, rating decision on the basis of CUE with respect to the issue of effective date for the award of service connection for PTSD are not met. 38 U.S.C. § 5109A; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.105(a). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from August 1967 to October 1968. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO)'s rating decision issued in January 2026. In the February 2026 VA Form 10182, Decision Review Request: Board Appeal (Notice of Disagreement), the Veteran elected the Direct Review docket. Therefore, the Board may only consider the evidence of record at the time of the January 2026 agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.301. Any evidence submitted after the AOJ decision on appeal cannot be considered by the Board. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.300, 20.301, 20.801. The Board notes that in the February 2026 VA Form 10182, the Veteran appears to raise a CUE claim in the March 1991 rating decision for failing to properly evaluate a through and through shrapnel wound to the chest for the first time. This issue has not been adjudicated by the AOJ. The Board cannot adjudicate the issue that the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) did not first consider and rule on. Jarrell v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 326, 331-32 (2006). The Veteran may file a claim using a proper form for this as to this issue. CUE A previous RO determination that is final and binding will be accepted as correct in the absence of CUE. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a). Here, a June 7, 1972, rating action granted service connection for shrapnel wound, left anterior chest and assigned a noncompensable rating under DC 7805 and denied service connection for anxiety neurosis. The veteran was notified of this decision and of his appellate rights. In this regard, the Board notes that a June 19, 1972, VA Form 21-6798 in the claims file reflects that the veteran was sent a VA Form 20-822, which in 1972 included an appellate rights statement as follows: You may appeal our decision to the Board of Veterans Appeals at any time within one year from the date of this letter if you believe the decision is not in accord with the law and the facts now of record. The appeal process is started by your filing a Notice of Disagreement. You may do this by writing a letter to this office stating that you wish to appeal and specifying what you disagree with. If you decide to appeal you will be further advised of your procedural rights as your claim progresses through the several stages of the appellate process. Thus, the evidence of record reflects that the veteran was notified of the June 7, 1972, rating decision and of the right to appeal. In this case, as the veteran did not initiate an appeal of the decision nor additional evidence was submitted within the appeal period, the June 7, 1972, rating decision, became final. 38 U.S.C. § 4005 (c) (1970); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.156, 19.118, 19.153 (1972). As for the March 27, 1991, rating decision, in that rating decision, the AOJ granted service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), effective January 30, 1989. The Veteran was notified of this decision in an April 11, 1991, notification letter, which included the VA Form 21-8764, Notice of Procedural and Appellate Rights. The Veteran did not file a notice of disagreement challenging the determination with respect to the effective date, nor was additional evidence for the issue received within one year of the April 11, 1991, notice letter. Thus, the March 27, 1991, rating decision became final. 38 U.S.C. § 4005 (c) (1988); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.156, 19.129, 19.192 (1990). In the April 2025 VA Form 20-0995, the Veteran's representative asserts the CUE claim in the March 11, 2025, rating decision. Since the April 2025 supplemental claim was submitted within the appeal period of the March 11, 2025, rating decision, that rating decision has not become final. As such, the claim of CUE is not applicable to that rating decision. Once a decision becomes final, it may only be revised by a showing of CUE. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.105. CUE is a very specific and rare kind of "error." It is the kind of error, of fact or of law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Simply to claim CUE on the basis that previous adjudications had improperly weighed and evaluated the evidence can never rise to the stringent definition of CUE. Similarly, neither can broad-brush allegations of "failure to follow the regulations" or "failure to give due process," or any other general, nonspecific claim of "error." Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 43-44 (1993). In addition, failure to address a specific regulatory provision involves harmless error unless the outcome would have been manifestly different. Id. at 44. Where evidence establishes CUE, the prior decision will be reversed or amended. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a). For the purpose of authorizing benefits, the rating or other adjudicatory decision which constitutes a reversal of a prior decision on the grounds of CUE has the same effect as if the corrected decision had been made on the date of the reversed decision. Id. CUE is established when the following conditions are met: (1) either (a) the correct facts in the record were not before the adjudicator, or (b) the statutory or regulatory provisions in existence at the time were incorrectly applied; (2) the alleged error must be "undebatable," not merely "a disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated"; and (3) the commission of the alleged error must have "manifestly changed the outcome" of the decision being attacked on the basis of CUE at the time that decision was rendered. Evans v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 180, 185 (2014), aff'd, 642 F. App'x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Damrel v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 242, 245 (1994); Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313-14 (1992). Evans v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 180, 187 (2014), aff'd, 642 F. App'x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The error must be of a type that is outcome-determinative, and subsequently developed evidence may not be considered in determining whether an error existed in the prior decision. See Porter v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 233, 235-36 (1993); Glover v. West, 185 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A manifest change in the outcome of an adjudication means that, absent the alleged CUE, the benefit sought would have been granted at the outset. King v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 433, 441 (2014). The standard is not whether it is reasonable to conclude that the outcome would have been different. Id. at 442. Review for clear and unmistakable error in a prior final decision of an agency of original jurisdiction must be based on the evidentiary record and the law that existed when that decision was made. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105 (a)(1)(iii). A judicial decision that formulates a new interpretation of the law subsequent to a final VA decision cannot be the basis of a valid CUE claim. George v. McDonough, 142 S. Ct. 1953 (2022). Although a judicial decision must be given full retroactive effect in all cases that are still open on direct review, it does not affect decisions that are final. Id. ; Smith v. West, 11 Vet. App. 134, 37-38 (1998); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758 (1995). The benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not for application in claims of CUE. Andrews v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 177, 186 (2004) (citing Russell, 3 Vet. App. at 313) (it is well established that the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine can never be applicable in assessing a CUE motion because the nature of such a motion is that it involves more than a disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated). While the Board has an obligation to read pro se filings liberally, this obligation does not extend to filings by counsel, as is the case here. See Andrews v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1278, 1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Thus, the Board will only address herein the theories explicitly raised by the appellant's attorney prior to the issuance of the January 2026 rating decision on appeal. 1. Entitlement to revision on the basis of CUE of a June 7, 1972, rating decision that assigned an initial noncompensable rating for left anterior chest scar under DC 7805, is denied. The Veteran, through his representative, contends that the AOJ committed CUE in the June 7, 1972, rating decision for failing to properly evaluate his through and through left anterior chest gunshot wound under DC 5303 and for ignoring the medical evidence of a retained foreign body in the left lung. See, e.g., April 2025 VA Form 20-0995. Specifically, the Veteran asserts that service treatment records (STRs) available at the time of the June 1972 adjudication includes a Clinical Record, Narrative Summary for a period of hospitalization from June 1968 to July 1968, with the physical exam findings of "Small Shrapnel wound left anterior chest and Xray evidence of: Small fragment in left lung." Id. Based on this finding, he maintains that the proper evaluation for a through and through wound is at least a moderate grade under 38 C.F.R. § 4.56 (b) and that the muscle group affected by the gunshot wound is controlled by DC 5303, wherein a moderate would is 20 percent disabling. Id. The Board notes that the June 1968 Clinical Record referenced by the Veteran as above indeed shows in the Lab Work section that there was "Small fragment in left lung, " and it additionally reflects a finding in the Hospital Course that wounds were debrided upon admission and that he had continued left chest pain "but follow-up [x-rays] normal." The same document notes in the History section, the Veteran "[r]eceived shrapnel wounds from hostile fire." Further, a May 1972 VA examination report was available to the adjudicator in June 1972. The present complaint at the examination reflected no shrapnel wound complaints. The examination showed the presence of a scar 12 cm along the side of the left nipple which was not adherent and not tender with no muscle loss. As part of the examination, an x ray of the chest was taken; it showed "[n]o significant pulmonary or pleural pathology" and that "[t]he cardiac contours and great vessels are normal." In contrast, an x ray of the right forearm and distal half of humerus, taken for the other shrapnel wound, reflected a finding of "a very small metallic chip in soft tissues of the upper arm close to the skin surface 10 cm. above the elbow joint posterolaterally." The pertinent law and regulations extant at the time of the June 1972 adjudication provide that for moderately severe disability of muscles, a factor to be considered in the evaluation of disabilities residual to healed wounds involving muscle groups due to gunshot or other trauma, is type of injury, which states: Through and through or deep penetrating wounds of relatively short track by single bullet or small shell or shrapnel fragment are to be considered as of at least moderate degree. Absence of explosive effect of high velocity missile and of residuals of debridement or of prolonged infection. 38 C.F.R. § 4.56 (b) (1972). In the June 7, 1972, rating decision, the AOJ summarized the findings from the STRs and the VA examination as above. It assigned a noncompensable evaluation for shrapnel wound, left anterior chest under DC 7805 and 20 percent for shrapnel wound of the right arm and forearm with paralysis, medial antebrachial cutaneous nerve under DC 5306-8566. Based on the above, the Board finds that the AOJ did not commit an error of law or facts as alleged by the Veteran for the following reasons. First, a review of the STRs confirms the Veteran's contention that an x ray showed a small fragment in left lung at the time of hospital admission in June 1968 prior to debridement. However, later x rays, taken post debridement at the end of the June to July 1968 hospital admission and post service in May 1972, indicated a normal chest; they no longer showed the presence of the small fragment in the left lung. Second, the evidence available at the time of the June 1972 adjudication contains another finding that in May 1972, the Veteran had a scar 12 cm along the side of the left nipple which was not adherent and not tender with no muscle loss, as residual of the shrapnel wound in the left anterior chest. Together with the normal x ray findings post debridement and the description of the scar with no muscle loss in a more recent examination, the evidence of record in June 1972 is capable of an interpretation that the small fragment in left lung found at the hospital admission in June 1968 was removed during the debridement and did not exist any longer. Third, the pertinent section 38 C.F.R. § 4.56 (b) requires consideration of other factors other than type of injury. Namely, the rater must consider history and complaint as well as objective findings in addition to the type of injury specifically referenced by the Veteran. For history and complaint, the rater must consider record in the file of consistent complaint of one or more of the cardinal symptoms of muscle wounds particularly fatigue and fatigue-pain after moderate use, affecting the particular functions controlled by injured muscles. 38 C.F.R. § 4.56 (b). Moreover, the rater must consider objective findings. On this point, 38 C.F.R. § 4.56 (b) states that Entrance and (if present) exist scars linear or relatively small and so situated as to indicate relatively short track of missile through muscle tissue; signs of moderate loss of deep fascia or muscle substance or impairment of muscle tonus, and of definite weakness or fatigue in comparative tests. 38 C.F.R. § 4.56 (b). Pertinent to the above factors, the May 1972 VA examination noted non tender, non-adherent scar on the left chest with no muscle loss. It does not indicate that the Veteran reported fatigue after moderate use affecting the particular functions controlled by chest muscles. Moreover, the VA examination does not indicate that the Veteran had moderate loss of deep fascia or muscle substance or impairment of muscle tonus nor definite weakness or fatigue in comparative tests. As such, the Board finds that the AOJ did not err in evaluating the residuals of the Veteran's shrapnel wound in the left anterior chest under a scar diagnosis code, DC 7805, because the contemporaneous evidence reflected the presence of a scar, but not the presence of other symptoms that were required for evaluation under the muscle injury diagnostic codes such as DC 5303. For the foregoing reasons, the claim of CUE in the June 1972 rating decision for failure to evaluate his shrapnel wound in the left anterior chest under a muscle injury diagnosis code must be denied. 2. Entitlement to revision on the basis of CUE of the June 7, 1972, rating decision that denied service connection for anxiety neurosis is denied. The Veteran, through his representative, asserts that the AOJ committed CUE in the June 1972 rating decision for failing to rebut the presumption of soundness when it found that a psychiatric disability preexisted service. See e.g., April 2025 VA Form 20-0995. The representative stated that the Veteran was discharged for psychiatric reasons that existed prior to entry into service. See April 2025 VA Form 27-0820. He notes that there were no mental issues upon entry into service. Id. The evidence extant at the time of the June 1972 rating decision reflects that the May 1967 entrance examination did not note any psychiatric conditions. A September 1968 Medical Board Report Cover Sheet reflects a primary diagnosis of emotional unstable personality. The origin of the disability was not due to own misconduct and not incurred in line of duty. It was further noted as "existed prior to entry, not aggravated by service." The probable future of duration was noted as "permanent." A September 1968 Medical Board Report documents that the Veteran was admitted to a hospital in September 1968 after being evaluated from the Republic of Vietnam for psychiatric evaluation. The Veteran stated on admission, "I just couldn't take it over there in Vietnam, there was too much violence." After conducting the mental status examination and interview with the Veteran, it was determined that the Veteran's lifelong difficulties in controlling his impulses in tolerating discipline and in coping with frustration have continued and had made a satisfactory adjustment impossible. It further notes that a conference of staff psychiatrist reviewed the available records and current findings and agreed that the Veteran had shown long-standing evidence of pathological emotional immaturity which precluded his rending any further useful service in the military. The diagnosis was established as "Emotionally Unstable Personality, Chronic, Severe," as manifested by the Veteran's lifelong history of inability to tolerate frustration, impulsive behavior, explosiveness, poor object relations and inability to cope with age-appropriate stresses. A May 1972 VA examination reflects the mental status examination where the Veteran was observed to be in good rapport and with no sign of psychosis. He was alert, had a pleasing personality, and was cheerful. The examiner noted the Veteran's report of how he became "greatly upset" and that he "wanted to commit suicide, everything seemed to crowd [him]" and then he was evacuated to St. Albans and was discharged there. The examiner noted that at the time of the May 1972 examination, he was no longer depressed, though he was mildly tense. The diagnosis was anxiety neurosis, incapacity minimal or none, competent. The examiner added a comment noting that the claims file was reviewed and symptoms in service were manifestation of the diagnosed condition. In the June 1972 rating decision, the AOJ noted the September 1968 hospitalization at St. Albans, after evacuating from Vietnam. It provided the summary of the findings as documented in the September 1968 Medical Board findings and the May 1972 VA examination. The AOJ determined that service connection for anxiety neurosis was denied because this condition pre-existed service and was not aggravated by service. The law and regulations extant at the time of the June 1972 rating decision are as follows. The veteran will be considered to have been in sound condition when examined, accepted and enrolled for service, except as to defects, infirmities, or disorders noted at entrance into service, or where clear and unmistakable (obvious or manifest) evidence demonstrates that an injury or disease existed prior thereto. Only such conditions as are recorded in examination reports are to be considered as noted. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (b) (1972). Prior to Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2004), notably, at the time of the June 1972 rating decision, the presumption of soundness only required clear and unmistakable evidence the disability existed prior to service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (b) (1972); VAOPGCPREC 3-2003 (July 16, 2003); 70 Fed. Reg. 23,027-01, 23,028 (May 4, 2005) (amending § 3.304(b) to require evidence of both preexistence and no aggravation); see also George v. McDonough, 991 F.3d 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (holding that the failure to require clear and unmistakable evidence of both a preexisting condition and a lack of in-service aggravation cannot be the basis of a CUE in a VA decision that pre-dates Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the invalidation of a VA regulation after a veteran's benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief based on clear and unmistakable error. George v. McDonough, 142 S. Ct. 1953, 1963 (2022). Accordingly, the Board considers 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (b) as existed at the time of the June 1972 adjudication. First of all, the Board finds that in the June 1972 rating decision, the AOJ erred in failing to apply the presumption of soundness as required under the law. However, this error is not outcome determinative because the evidence extant at the time of the June 1972 rating decision rebuts the presumption of soundness. The evidence extant at the time of the June 1972 adjudication reflects that no psychiatric disability was noted on entrance examination and there was an in-service manifestation. Accordingly, the presumption of soundness attaches. Thus, VA must show clear and unmistakable evidence that the disability existed prior to service. In the present case, both September 1968 Medical Board report and the May 1972 VA examination show that the Veteran had psychiatric disability prior to entering service. The September 1968 Medical Board report provided the diagnosis of "Emotionally Unstable Personality, Chronic, Severe," as manifested by the Veteran's lifelong history of inability to tolerate frustration, impulsive behavior, explosiveness, poor object relations and inability to cope with age-appropriate stresses. Being determined as "lifelong" based on the report of his childhood stories, this evidence shows that the Veteran had chronic emotionally unstable personality since his childhood. Moreover, the May 1972 VA examination provided the current diagnosis of anxiety neurosis and the examiner opined that the symptoms shown in service were manifestation of the current diagnosis. These medical examinations can be interpreted together to reach a logical conclusion that the current diagnosis of anxiety neurosis at the time of the June 1972 rating decision was determined to have manifested as the in-service diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality, which was determined by service medical professionals to have existed prior to service. Since there is no other evidence pertaining to the Veteran's psychiatric disability at the time of the June 1972 rating decision, the September 1968 Medial Board report and the May 1972 VA examination provided clear and unmistakable, i.e., obvious or manifest, evidence at the time of the June 1972 adjudication demonstrating that the Veteran's current anxiety neurosis existed prior to service. For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that although the AOJ failed to apply the presumption of soundness in the June 1972 rating decision, such error is not outcome determinative because the correct application of the presumption of soundness to the facts available at the time of the June 1972 rating decision leads to the same outcome, denial of the claim. The evidence extant at the time of the June 1972 rating decision rebuts the presumption due to the fact that the entirety of the evidence logically leads to the conclusion that the Veteran's anxiety neurosis existed prior to service. No evidence of record at the time of the June 1972 rating decision raises other possibilities. Accordingly, the claim of CUE in the June 1972 rating decision for failure to apply the presumption of soundness properly must be denied. 3. Entitlement to an effective date prior to January 30, 1989, for the award of service connection for PTSD on the basis of CUE in a March 27, 1991, rating decision, for failing to reconsider the claim under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (c) due to additional service records associated with the claims file in March 1983, is denied. The Veteran, though his representative, contends that the "records reflects [VA] received previously unseen service department records in March 1983, which included a medical record titled: 'Abstract of Service and Medical History'" and this document included the following notation: DISCH DIAG: (FT: 18 AUG 68) COMBAT STRESS REACTION #3264 DNEPTE. He asserts that this should have been sufficient to reconsider under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) the claim of service connection for a psychiatric disability that was denied in the June 1972 rating decision. See April 2025 VA Form 20-0995. He maintains that it is CUE that the AOJ failed to consider applicability of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (c) in a March 27, 1991, rating decision, in light of the newly associated service record when deciding the effective date for the award of service connection for a psychiatric disability. Id. As noted above, while the Board has an obligation to read pro se filings liberally, this obligation does not extend to filings by counsel, as is the case here. See Andrews v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1278, 1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Thus, the Board will only address herein the CUE theory explicitly raised by the appellant's attorney prior to the issuance of the January 2026 rating decision on appeal. At the time of the March 1991 adjudication, 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (1990) provides that (a) New and material evidence received prior to the expiration of the appeal period, or prior to the appellate decision if a timely appeal has been filed (including evidence received prior to an appellate decision and referred to the agency of original jurisdiction by the Board of Veterans Appeals without consideration in that decision in accordance with the provisions of §19.174 (c)(1) of this chapter), will be considered as having been filed in connection with the claim which was pending at the beginning of the appeal period. (b) Where the new and material evidence consists of a supplemental report from the service department, received before or after the decision has become final, the former decision will be reconsidered by the adjudicating agency of original jurisdiction. This comprehends official service department records which presumably have been misplaced and have now been located and forwarded to the Department of Veterans Affairs. Also included are corrections by the service department of former errors of commission or omission in the preparation of the prior report or reports and identified as such. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (1990). The Board notes that the regulations did not define what "new and material evidence" was until January 1991. According to the Federal Register, 55 Fed. Reg. 52274, 52275, (Dec. 21, 1990), section 3.156 was amended to include a paragraph (a) defining new and material evidence as "evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers which bears directly and substantially upon the specific matter under consideration, which is neither cumulative nor redundant, and which by itself or in connection with evidence previously assembled is so significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the claim." This became effective on January 22, 1991. Since the challenged rating decision was issued in March 1991 and the amended 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a) was in effect at that time, the Board considers whether the additional service record associated with the claims file in March 1983 was new and material according to the amended version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a). The amendment did not change the paragraph (c). A review of the March 1991 rating decision indicates that the AOJ did not specifically determine whether the additional service record associated with the claims file in March 1983 was new and material evidence warranting reconsideration under § 3.156. However, the failure to consider the applicability of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (c) is not outcome determinative because even if the March 1983 service record were new and material evidence, the evidence available at the time of the March 1983 rating decision (and the June 1972 rating decision) still contains both (1) the September 1968 STR documenting the Veteran's report of stressful experience in Vietnam and a diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality, which was determined preexisted service and (2) the May 1972 VA examination, which diagnosed the Veteran with anxiety neurosis and opined that the psychiatric symptoms manifested in service was due to that diagnosis. The evidence noting the in-service diagnosis of "combat stress reaction, DNEPTE" could consistently be weighed with the existing evidence so as to be interpreted that the combat stress reaction, DNEPTE because he had never had a combat experience, was an acute flareup of the pre-existing anxiety neurosis and personality disorder. Accordingly, even if the referenced additional service record were considered as new and material evidence, the conclusion reached in the prior June 1972 and March 1983 rating decisions would not have changed undebatably because the outcome would depend on how adjudicators would weigh the evidence. On this point, the Board notes that in Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 43 (1993), the Court held that neither a claim alleging improper weighing and evaluating of the evidence in a previous adjudication, nor general, non-specific claims (including sweeping allegations of failures to follow the regulations or to provide due process), meet the restrictive definition of CUE. Id. at 44. For the foregoing reasons, the claim of CUE in the March 1991 rating decision for failure to reconsider the claim of service connection for psychiatric disability, that was denied in the June 1972 and the March 1983 rating decisions, based on additional service record associated with the claims file in March 1983, is denied. Emily Tamlyn Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board Y. Taylor, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.